ABSTRACT. This Note undertakes an empirical examination of U.S. enforcement actions under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) in order to explore the cross-national patterns associated with the United States' international antibribery enforcement. I investigate a number of possible determinants of FCPA enforcement, including variation in the level of U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI), cross-national variation in corruption levels, the level of foreign regulatory and enforcement cooperation with the United States, and U.S. foreign policy interests. I find that higher levels of U.S. FDI and higher levels of corruption are significantly associated with increased FCPA enforcement, as is the presence of bilateral mechanisms of enforcement cooperation. In contrast, other variables -including the level of foreign policy alignment between the host nation and the United States -do not appear to be associated with variation in FCPA enforcement. In addition, I find that cross-national variation in the number of FCPA cases in a given country is much more closely associated with actual recorded experience with corruption (as measured by cross-national survey instruments) than with more widely used measures of corruption perceptions. Finally, I employ data on past enforcement actions to generate a cross-national measure of the "FCPA enforcement-action intensity" of U.S. FDI, and I consider the potential use of such an index as a measure of FCPA country risk.
INTRODUCTION
opaque -in a number of respects,' and our understanding of the factors that influence FCPA charging decisions in practice remains incomplete."o This Note examines one aspect of this issue: the cross-national patterns associated with U.S. enforcement actions under the FCPA. After years of aggressive enforcement, what conclusions can we draw regarding the crossnational distribution of FCPA cases? How closely does variation in the relative number of FCPA cases associated with different foreign nations track perceived cross-national variation in corruption levels? Do the data suggest the existence of a link between U.S. foreign policy considerations and FCPA charging decisions? Are countries that cooperate more closely with U.S. authorities more likely to be associated with FCPA enforcement actions?
This Note proceeds in five parts. In Part I, I provide an overview of the FCPA and briefly examine the law's enforcement history. In Part II, I present a number of hypotheses regarding possible cross-national influences on FCPA enforcement. In Part III, I introduce a new cross-national dataset of FCPA enforcement actions. I then propose and test a simple model to explain crossnational variation in FCPA enforcement actions, in which the number of FCPA cases associated with a given host country is a function of (1) the level of U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) stock in the country and (2) the level of When agencies enforce a law outside an adversarial system, without appropriate checks and balances or judicial scrutiny, it leads to a framework of inconsistent fine and penalty amounts, inconsistent and opaque charging decisions, lack of consistency and transparency, and rhetoric not matching reality, all of which were hallmarks of FCPA enforcement in 2010.
Id. Beyond the FCPA context, legal scholars have noted over the past fifty years that the role of prosecutorial discretion in enforcement remains relatively underexplored. See generally corruption in that country. Testing this model via multivariate regression analysis, I find that both of these factors are significantly associated with crossnational variation in FCPA enforcement levels, and that this relationship is robust to the inclusion of a number of controls (including GDP per capita and regional fixed effects). Moreover, I find that the presence of bilateral mechanisms of regulatory and enforcement cooperation between the United States and a given host country is strongly associated with increased FCPA enforcement in that country. In contrast, other variables -including foreign policy alignment between the host nation and the United States -do not appear to be associated with variation in FCPA enforcement levels. In addition, I find that cross-national variation in the number of FCPA cases in a given country is more closely associated with actual recorded experience with corruption (as measured by cross-national survey instruments) than with more widely used measures of corruption perceptions. This finding could provide some support to those who have questioned whether measures of corruption perceptions are truly successful in capturing underlying variation in corruption levels.
Today, ascertaining and quantifying FCPA country risk is an important challenge facing multinational firms and legal practitioners. Although indices of corruption perceptions have been a traditional source of data for judging the level of enforcement risk, the efficacy of using perceptions-based measures has, in recent years, come under increasing criticism in the academic literature." In Part IV, I suggest an alternative approach: I calculate a cross-national measure of the "FCPA enforcement-action intensity" of U.S. FDI." Such a metric might be employed both as a way for private sector actors to quantify FCPA risk and, potentially, as a way to proxy cross-national variation in underlying corruption levels in the academic study of corruption.
I. THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
The FCPA was enacted in 1977 following a series of investigations that uncovered widespread illicit payment of bribes to foreign officials by U.S.
n1. See infra Section IV.A (collecting sources).
12. This effort is in some ways analogous to attempts to generate measures of the relative "pollution intensity" of trade and FDI. See, e.g., Bijit Bora, FDI and no. 2, art. 4, at 23-24 (2004) , http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/advances/vol4/iss2/art4. firms. 13 Adopted as an amendment to the 1934 Securities Exchange Act, the FCPA itself was subsequently amended in 1988'4 and 1998." The 1998 amendments established, inter alia, extraterritorial jurisdiction over violations of the FCPA by U.S. nationals."
The provisions of the FCPA fall into two general categories. First, the FCPA's antibribery provisions criminalize the act of "corruptly" making an "offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization of the payment of any money" to "any foreign official for purposes of . . . influencing any act or decision of such foreign official in his official capacity . . or . .. inducing such foreign official to use his influence with a foreign government . .. in order to assist . . . in obtaining or retaining business."
17 These provisions apply to three categories of persons: U.S. issuers, 8 "domestic concerns,"" and "any person other than an issuer . . . or a domestic concern" who acts "while in the territory of the United States." 2 o Second, the FCPA imposes on U.S. issuers certain accounting requirements, which themselves fall into two categories. Issuers must "make
13.
In response to allegations that emerged, in part, as a consequence of the congressional Watergate inquiry, the SEC initiated an investigation that exposed questionable foreign payments by more than four hundred U.S. (2001) ("Jurisdictionally, the amendments extended the assertion of nationality-based jurisdiction to reach acts committed by U.S. nationals outside the United States.").
17.
15 U.S.C. § 7 8dd-2(a)(1) (20o6). Payments to foreign political parties for the same purposes are also prohibited. Id. 5 7 8dd-2(a)(2). i8. Id. § 7 8dd-i. This category includes "any issuer which has a class of securities registered pursuant to section 781 ... or which is required to file reports under section 78o (d) ." Id.
19.
Id. § 7 8dd-2. The term "domestic concern" encompasses "any individual who is a citizen, national, or resident of the United States" and "any corporation, partnership, association, joint-stock company, business trust, unincorporated organization, or sole proprietorship which has its principal place of business in the United States, or which is organized under the laws of a State of the United States or a territory, possession, or commonwealth of the United States." Id. 5 7 8dd-2(h)(1).
20.
Id. § 7 8dd-3(a). and keep books, records, and accounts, which, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of the issuer."" Issuers must also "devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances" of compliance." Both the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) are responsible for enforcing the antibribery provisions of the Act, while the SEC enforces the internal controls and the books and records provisions."
Enforcement of the FCPA during the Act's first two decades was limited.' However, recent years have seen a dramatic surge in enforcement actions brought under the FCPA." A number of reasons have been suggested for this rise in enforcement, including increased international trade and investment,
21.
Id.5 7 8m(b)(2)(A).
22.
Id. 5 78m(b)(2)(B). Specifically, issuers are required to establish controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that (i) transactions are executed in accordance with management's general or specific authorization; (ii) transactions are recorded as necessary (I) to permit preparation of financial statements in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles or any other criteria applicable to such statements, and (II) to maintain accountability for assets; (iii) access to assets is permitted only in accordance with management's general or specific authorization; and (iv) the recorded accountability for assets is compared with the existing assets at reasonable intervals and appropriate action is taken with respect to any differences .... 
Id.

See
25.
See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 4, at 450 (noting an "exponential" increase in the Act's enforcement). 
II. POSSIBLE DETERMINANTS OF CROSS-NATIONAL FCPA ENFORCEMENT PATTERNS
In recent years, the enforcement agencies have sought to increase the transparency of charging decisions by publishing memoranda outlining the for the recent explosion in transnational bribery. Clearly, the offer of bribes and export of corruption by investors from Western countries is among those reasons."). 
27.
Convention on Combating
A. Investment
First, we might expect to see a greater number of FCPA cases associated with countries in which U.S. firms have more extensive investment. All else being equal, where the U.S. investment presence is greater, the likelihood that U.S. firms will become embroiled in FCPA violations should similarly be higher. Granted, employing U.S. FDI as an independent variable in explaining the distribution of FCPA cases is potentially problematic: several recent U.S. FCPA enforcement actions have involved foreign-headquartered entitiesincluding, for example, the 2010 enforcement actions against Siemens AG of Germany and Alcatel-Lucent S.A. of France." Foreign corporations can be 30. For example, the DOJ's general policy on corporate charging decisions is set out in DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-28.300 (1997, rev. ed. Aug. 2008) [hereinafter U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL], available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/ eousa/foia readingroom/usam/title9/28mcrm.htm. This document establishes nine principles that inform the determination of whether to bring charges for corporate wrongdoing, including under the FCPA. The factors to be considered include "the nature and seriousness of the offense," the "pervasiveness of wrongdoing within the corporation," the "history of similar misconduct," whether "timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing" was undertaken, the existence of satisfactory compliance programs, whether remedial actions were undertaken, the "collateral consequences" of a charging decision, the "adequacy of the prosecution of individuals," and the "adequacy" of "civil or regulatory enforcement actions." Id. Also noteworthy in this respect is the recent announcement by the DOJ that the organization will provide "detailed new guidance on the 
B. Corruption
Second, we might expect to see a relationship between the number of FCPA cases involving a given country's government officials and the level of corruption in that country. The existence of such a relationship is, in a sense, intuitive: so long as we are willing to assume (1) that the probability that firm X becomes involved in an FCPA enforcement action associated with X's involvement in country Y is not independent of the probability that X actually engaged in FCPA violations in country Y," and (2) that the probability that X engaged in FCPA violations in country Y is at least in part a function of the general level of corruption in country Y, then, all else being equal, we might expect to see a positive association between corruption levels and relative numbers of FCPA enforcement actions. 
C. Foreign Policy
Third, a link between FCPA enforcement and American foreign policy interests may exist. While the FCPA focuses exclusively on the "supply side" of bribery-its enforcement punishes those who offer bribes, not the foreign government officials who take them" -we might expect to see more FCPA cases associated with countries whose governments are less friendly (or less strategically important) to the United States. By their nature, FCPA investigations and enforcement actions bring to light allegations of 38. As in the case of economic sanctions, this is a highly debatable proposition. See Spalding, supra note 4, at 396. As Spalding notes:
If current enforcement trends continue, any of three aggregate outcomes might result, none of which is satisfactory. The first is that targeted countries will respond to the economic withdrawal by implementing domestic reforms. While this might be the most desirable outcome, it is certainly not the most likely. Indeed, economic sanctions literature casts substantial doubt on whether this can ever be a realistic foreign policy goal: it is at best uncertain whether these sanctions can succeed in effecting reforms in emerging markets. There are several mechanisms through which a relationship between U.S. foreign policy and FCPA enforcement might operate. First, given that tips from United States embassies in foreign jurisdictions are one potential source of information that can result in investigations, it may be that those nations whose governments are more closely aligned with the United States are more likely to generate actionable information relating to potential FCPA violations. 4 s Selective FCPA enforcement also could theoretically be employed as a foreign policy tool to disproportionately target regimes that are hostile to the United States.4 6 Likewise, countries that are favored by the United States or are important to America's strategic interests may tend to be more successful in exerting pressure to have an investigation discontinued. As one author has noted:
Id
[T]he interests of the foreign sovereign are very much in play, even though the foreign sovereign him or herself can never personally become a defendant or target in an FCPA criminal investigation in the United States. Loyalty to the U.S. business partner and alleged bribesupplier is one potential interest of the foreign sovereign. Of course the real interest of the foreign sovereign is to avoid public disclosure of his or her own secrets about how he or she has amassed and hidden the allegedly ill-gotten wealth."
The extent to which a foreign sovereign might seek to exert influence over the enforcement process is dramatically underscored by events surrounding an early-2000s federal grand jury investigation. During the course of litigation associated with the grand jury investigation -which involved allegations of foreign bribery associated with the government of a then-unnamed foreign 45 The request from the Republic of Kazakhstan for respect and deference under international comity doctrines is contrasted with Kazakhstan's lack of respect for the United States. The foreign government intervened in a U.S. judicial proceeding against a U.S. person. Not content with intervening in the legal proceeding, the foreign government then attempted to subvert the prosecution by political lobbying inside the U.S. government. In recent weeks, BAE and the Saudi embassy had frantically lobbied the government for the long-running investigation to be discontinued, with the company insisting it was poised to lose another lucrative Saudi contract if it was allowed to go on. . . . [The attorney general] consulted the prime minister, the defence secretary, foreign secretary, and the intelligence services, and they decided that "the wider public interest" "outweighed the need to maintain the rule of law."
Id.
role in the decision to discontinue the investigation when he stated that electing to move forward with a prosecution in the case would have resulted in "the complete wreckage of a vital strategic relationship and the loss of thousands of British jobs.""
D. Enforcement Cooperation
Fourth, we might expect to see more FCPA prosecutions in those countries that most closely cooperate with U.S. enforcement agencies. By their nature, FCPA investigations and prosecutions raise a number of issues associated with international coordination and cooperation between enforcement agencies. Reflecting the salience of these issues in the FCPA context, the United States Attorneys' Manual notes the following:
The investigation and prosecution of particular allegations of violations of the FCPA will raise complex enforcement problems abroad as well as difficult issues of jurisdiction and statutory construction. For example, part of the investigation may involve interviewing witnesses in foreign countries concerning their activities with high-level foreign government officials. In addition, relevant accounts maintained in United States banks and subject to subpoena may be directly or beneficially owned by senior foreign government officials.s 2 In fact, the DOJ has gone so far as to characterize "the lack of cooperation in obtaining evidence located outside the United States" as " [t] he chief difficulty in investigating and prosecuting foreign bribery cases."" Nevertheless, as cross-border investigations have increased in number and complexity, U.S. authorities have responded to these challenges by entering into a growingalthough incomplete-network of agreements designed to promote First, the DOJ may make a request for evidence or other assistance under a mutual legal assistance treaty (MLAT), a type of bilateral intergovernmental agreement that obliges foreign jurisdiction authorities to render assistance." The DOJ's reliance on MLATs has been readily apparent in the FCPA context; in 2009, a senior official noted "at least twenty-five cooperation requests to foreign governments pursuant to mutual legal assistance treaties over the past twelve months."'' Regarding the outcomes of its requests for legal cooperation, the DOJ "has experienced the gamut of cooperation-from full-scale sharing of domestic investigative files on short notice to outright non-compliance."" Nevertheless, the "vast majority" of requests to foreign jurisdictions pursuant to MLATs in FCPA investigations have been granted." Second, the SEC has entered into a network of memoranda of understanding (MOUs) with foreign securities regulators.s" These agreements, according to the SEC, "delineate the terms of information-sharing between and among MOU signatories and create a framework for regular and predictable cooperation in securities law enforcement.
As one author has noted:
The use of MLATs and MOUs has been particularly effective in international SEC investigations to assist the SEC in circumventing foreign secrecy and "blocking" statutes to trace the flow of funds through foreign banks and trusts. Thus, bribes paid through secret foreign bank accounts in FCPA cases may be uncovered by the SEC Staff through MLAT and MOU requests to foreign governmental authorities.
Of course, it is also possible that an alternative relationship between regulatory and enforcement cooperation may exist: perhaps when the United States has a strong enforcement relationship with the host country, U.S. authorities are more willing to defer to foreign prosecutors in the interests of international comity. 
A. Data Sources
In order to systematically evaluate the potential influence that these four factors might have on cross-national patterns in FCPA enforcement, I construct a new dataset covering of all civil and criminal FCPA cases initiated between January 1, 2000, and July 1, 2011. The dataset includes 127 foreign countriesall countries with populations of at least 500,000 for which basic country-level data (including data on U.S. FDI stock) were available. I construct the dataset by examining all releases from the DOJ" and SEC 6 4 that reference the FCPA.
,
I exclude enforcement actions relating solely to payments to Iraqi government officials, reflecting the unique history of the anticorruption investigations associated with the United Nations' Oil-for-Food Program. 6 6 I include all Commission (FTC) routinely consider comity factors in the exercise of their prosecutorial discretion."); see also Anthony J. Colangelo , 2010 ), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2o1o/ Janualy/o-crm-o48.html ("The indictments allege that the defendants engaged in a scheme to pay bribes to the minister of defense for a country in Africa. In fact, the scheme was part of the undercover operation, with no actual involvement from any minister of defense."). Finally, as proxies for the level of regulatory and enforcement cooperation with U.S. authorities, I examine whether each country in the dataset had in place with the United States (i) a mutual legal assistance treaty or (2) a bilateral enforcement cooperation or technical assistance memorandum of understanding between the SEC and that country's securities regulators. These two dichotomous variables are set to one if such an agreement was in Polity IV 
68.
This data is per the
S. DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE: A LIST OF TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN FORCE ON JANUARY 1, 2000 (2000)
.
effect as of January 1, 2000 (the beginning of the observation period). Descriptive statistics and a correlation matrix are set out below in Tables i and  2 , respectively. Before turning to the results of the analysis, a discussion of the mechanisms through which FCPA cases come to light is appropriate. Violations of the FCPA come to the attention of the SEC and DOJ from a wide variety of sources, including routine compliance checks, audits, due diligence associated with transactions, tips to U.S. authorities from competitors or employees, and private lawsuits that reference violations of the FCPA. 9 Many violations are also self-reported by firms.o The Federal Sentencing Guidelines favor disclosure to the authorities of any possible violations of the FCPA,8' providing firms with an incentive to self-report to the SEC and DOJ. In my dataset, however, I aggregate all FCPA violations. In other words, I assume for the purposes of my analysis that the possible cross-national determinants of FCPA enforcement patterns outlined above are applicable to all categories of FCPA cases. First, on a practical level, such an assumption is rendered necessary by the fact that the original source of the information that results in an FCPA investigation is often not disclosed. Second, to the extent that the operation of prosecutorial discretion may influence cross-national patterns in FCPA enforcement, it is important to recognize that the capacity of prosecutors to exercise discretion exists regardless of the ultimate source of the information regarding the violation: in other words, the enforcement agencies may elect not to pursue a given case regardless of whether information on an alleged violation comes to the attention of the authorities during the course of an investigation, as a result of a tip, or as a consequence of a firm's decision to self-report."' Third, in the case of self-reported violations, the likelihood of a violation's discovery by other means has long been recognized to play a key role in the corporate decision to self-report a violation." Thus, the same factors which influence the likelihood of detection probably also increase the 
83
. See RICHARD S. GRUNER, CORPORATE CRIME AND SENTENCING 927 (1994) (identifying the issue of whether "the situation [is] one that the government is likely to discover eventually anyway" as a relevant consideration in making the decision to report an offense); Robert W. likelihood that an infraction will be self-reported. (Alternatively, certain mechanisms through which cases come to light, such as tips to authorities from disgruntled employees, may simply constitute random noise.) I further assume that observations of my dependent variable (FCPA enforcement actions) are independent of one another. There are two potential problems associated with this assumption, both of which relate to the presence of multinational firms. First, the detection of an FCPA violation in one country may increase the likelihood of a discovery of further FCPA violations in a firm's operations elsewhere in the world; having begun an inquiry into one violation, the government may discover subsequent violations during the course of its investigations. Second, the detection of an FCPA violation in one country may increase the likelihood that a firm may elect to self-report other violations to the authorities." Although admittedly not unproblematic, this assumption is nevertheless justified for several reasons. First, even assuming that, all else being equal, the discovery of a violation in one country makes discovery of additional violations elsewhere in the world more likely, the same factors that influenced the likelihood of the initial detection may also (at least at the margins) influence the likelihood of the detection of additional violations." Second, even if a discovery by the authorities of a multinational firm's FCPA violation in one country does increase the probability of discovering further violations (whether via self-reporting or government detection), the analysis 
85.
For example, in the case of the decision to self-report additional violations following the discovery of a violation in one country, this dynamic might be expressed more formally in the following way. For any ongoing FCPA violation at a given firm, let the probability (p) that the violation will be detected by the government equal:
where F represents the set of factors that influence the likelihood of the government's detecting the violation assuming that no other violation had already been detected, and D equals a dichotomous variable set to one if the government has detected a violation elsewhere in the firm's worldwide operations. Moreover, let a be some coefficient in the range [o, (i bD)/F], and let b be some coefficient in the range [o, (1-aF) /D]. Assume that a firm will self-report an infraction to the U.S. authorities if and only if the probability of detection exceeds a certain threshold (p'). It is true that there may exist some set of cases such that p' > aF + b(o) and p' < aF + b(i). Yet even assuming that this is the caseassuming, in other words, that there exist certain cases in which the government's discovery of a violation by the firm elsewhere in the world is a but-for cause of the decision to self-report-as long as we posit that p' > b(s) for at least some subset of cases, we might continue to expect variation in F to be associated with self-reporting decision outcomes.
below nevertheless seeks to control for cross-national variation in the concentration of multinational firms (and thus for any potential inflation of the dependent variable caused by the greater presence of multinational firms in a given country) by holding constant the level of U.S. FDI.8 6
B. Results and Analysis
In order to explain cross-national variation in FCPA enforcement, I begin by proposing a simple model in which the number of FCPA enforcement actions associated with a given country is a function of (1) the level of U.S. FDI stock and (2) the level of corruption. The econometric specification of the basic model is as follows:
where FCPA CASES is the total number of FCPA enforcement actions in a given country, USFDI represents the total amount of U.S. FDI stock,8' COR represents the level of corruption, X represents a vector of other covariates, a is the constant, and e is the error term. In Table 3 , I perform a series of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression analyses to examine this relationship (regressions one and two). I explore the effects of regulatory and enforcement cooperation, military alliance status, and foreign policy proxies in regressions three through nine. In regressions ten through twelve, I explore the impact of adopting the ICVS data as my proxy for corruption levels. In Table 4 , I repeat these analyses, with additional controls for regional fixed effects." I set out the results of these analyses below. 88. Adopting North America as my baseline, I employ the following regional dummies: Asia, Central and Eastern Europe, the Middle East, South America, Scandinavia, and Western Europe. go. White-corrected for heteroskedasticity (robust t-statistics in parentheses). *** p < 0.01, ** P < 0.05, * p < 0.1. I find that there is a significant relationship between the cross-national distribution of FCPA cases and both U.S. foreign investment and variation in corruption levels (significant at the 1% confidence level). This relationship is robust to the inclusion of controls for such variables as per capita GDP and regional fixed effects (see Table 4 ).
Although the presence of a mutual legal assistance treaty with a given country was not a significant predictor of FCPA enforcement levels, the presence of regulatory and enforcement cooperation with the SEC was a significant determinant of FCPA enforcement (even when additional controls were added to the regression). On the other hand, most proxies for foreign policy considerations do not appear to be significantly associated with crossnational variation in FCPA enforcement levels once other relevant factors are controlled for. Although the results in Table 3 suggest that the presence of a U.S. military alliance is associated with fewer FCPA enforcement cases (controlling for the level of regulatory cooperation), this relationship largely disappears once regional controls are added (Table 4) . One cannot entirely discount a causal relationship, however, given potential collinearity between the military alliance variable and certain regional dummies (particular Western Europe and South America).
Other variables-including regime type and General Assembly voting alignment -were not significantly associated with cross-national variation in FCPA cases. This finding suggests that FCPA enforcement may, in practice, operate in a way that is consistent with the rhetoric of the enforcement agencies. 91 Similarly, the data lend support to the notion that U.S. enforcement practices under the FCPA operate in a manner that is consistent with Article 5 of the OECD Convention, which provides that the "[i]nvestigation and prosecution of the bribery of a foreign public official .. . shall not be influenced by considerations of national economic interest, the potential effect upon relations with another State or the identity of the natural or legal persons involved."" Interestingly, cross-national variation in the number of FCPA cases is much more closely associated with variation in actual recorded experience with corruption (as measured by the ICVS survey) than with the measure of corruption perceptions employed (see regressions ten through twelve of Tables 3 and 4). However, the relatively small number (forty-one) of countries in the dataset for which ICVS data is available requires that this finding be viewed with some caution.
IV. TOWARD AN ENFORCEMENT-BASED CROSS-NATIONAL MEASURE OF FCPA RISK?
A. The Importance ofFCPA Risk Assessment and the Role of Corruption Perceptions Measures
Few regulatory and compliance issues today have a higher profile than the FCPA; as one work recently noted, " [T] he mere utterance of the acronym FCPA is enough to instill deep concern, and even fear, in corporate suites throughout the world."" As firms seek to bolster and maintain anticorruption compliance programs in a world of increased FCPA enforcement, accurately assessing the relative FCPA country risk of the various foreign nations in which a multinational firm operates is a key challenge facing management teams, compliance officials, and legal practitioners alike. The FCPA risk profile of an organization may vary dramatically depending on the specific countries in which a firm does business; consequently, firms have long been counseled to tailor compliance programs by focusing finite compliance resources on "highrisk" countries.
9 4 Similarly, as a condition of entering into certain deferred prosecution agreements, the DOJ has required firms to maintain compliance programs that take into account the risks associated with the "geographical organization" ofa firm's business." The reliability of the Corruption Perceptions Index may also deteriorate over time. As the index has become widely publicized, there is a danger that survey respondents, rather than reporting how much "real" corruption exists around them, are reporting what they believe based on the highly publicized results of the most recent TI index."o 2 Others have raised various methodological questions regarding the ways in which the corruption perceptions indices are compiled.'o 3 In fact, given the limitations inherent in using subjective corruption perceptions as a proxy for underlying corruption levels, a number of scholars have sought to generate various alternative measures of corruption, ranging from comparisons of the relative costs of public works projectso' to the relative number of New York City parking tickets accrued by countries' missions to the United Nations."'o Moreover, even if we assume that corruption-perceptions indices do accurately and fully capture cross-national variation in corruption, such measures would still not capture variances in enforcement that were the result of other factors -such as greater enforcement cooperation between the United States and the country in question. A measure based on enforcement data, on the other hand, would reflect such variation. Thus, although the use of enforcement statistics in the cross-national context can often be problematic,"o 6 deriving a measure of FCPA country risk based on enforcement statistics may nevertheless represent a compelling alternative to relying solely on perceptions measures.
B. Examining the "FCPA Enforcement-Action Intensity" of U.S. FDI But how might we construct an enforcement-based measure? A simple comparison of the total number of enforcement actions associated with a given country would, of course, be largely unhelpful as a unit of measure because the U.S. business presence varies so greatly from country to country. Consequently, for each country I generate a measure of the log of the ratio of FCPA enforcement actions to the total level of U.S. investment (as proxied by total U.S. FDI stock as of the year 2000) -or, in other words, a measure of the "FCPA enforcement-action intensity" of U.S. FDI in different foreign countries."o 7 By tying incidents of a negative externality to a given level of investment, this effort is arguably analogous to recent attempts to analyze the relative "pollution intensity" of investment and trade. oS I plot this measure 
Control of Corruption Indicator (CCI) (2000)
The two measures are relatively highly correlated, with an R of o.66. But having established that levels of FCPA prosecutions track cross-national variation in perceived corruption, a key question is this: Are corruption perceptions, or varying levels of corruption itself, driving enforcement? My analysis in Part III provides some initial support for the latter hypothesis, given that FCPA enforcement patterns tend to more closely track survey-based experiential measures of corruption than traditional perceptions-based measures.!o 9 Nevertheless, these results must be viewed with caution in light of the small sample size, and this remains an open question in many respects.
If our goal is simply to use cross-national enforcement data to generate a measure of "FCPA risk," this endogeneity concern is less salient; regardless of whether certain countries are being disproportionately targeted because they are perceived as being corrupt (for example, by government officials when deciding where to focus investigations), or whether a greater number of FCPA cases in a given country is truly illustrative of cross-national variation in underlying corruption levels, the implications at the firm level (in terms of how compliance resources ought to be allocated) are similar.
iog. Similarly, the correlation between the log of the ratio of enforcement actions to U.S. FDI and the ICVS data is 0.73, versus (as discussed above) an R of o.66 in the case of the CCI data. However, only twenty-one countries have data available for both the log-transformed enforcement ratio and for the ICVS survey.
If, however, we broaden our focus and attempt to employ FCPA enforcement data in a cross-national measure of corruption simpliciter, then the picture becomes significantly murkier as endogeneity issues come to the fore. The notion of using enforcement data as a measure of corruption is, at least superficially, an attractive one. After all, if patterns in the cross-national distribution of America's FCPA cases are largely the result of investigators and prosecutors simply "follow[ing] the evidence,".o then surely we might glean useful information on relative corruption levels from the cross-national distribution of FCPA cases. Such a measure would provide those engaged in research on the determinants and consequences of corruption with a new dataset that is both cross-national in scope and tied to the micro-foundations of corruption -bribes (allegedly) paid by firms to government officials -rather than simply based on perceptions of corruption.
However, for the "FCPA enforcement-action intensity" of U.S. FDI to serve as a viable cross-national measure of corruption, two key conditions would have to hold. First, the level of U.S. FDI in a given country would have to be independent of corruption perceptions."' Second, corruption perceptions io. Qualters, supra note 91; cf Robert S. Mueller, III, Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Address to the American Bar Association Litigation Section Annual Conference (Apr. 17, 2008), available at http://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/corporate-fraud-and-public-corruption -are-we-becoming-more-crooked ("The FBI is uniquely situated to address public corruption. We have the skills to conduct sophisticated investigations. But more than that, we are insulated from political pressure. We are able to go where the evidence leads us, without fear of reprisal or recrimination.").
ms. Although such a relationship might seem intuitive, the evidence is mixed. At a theoretical level, two competing hypotheses as to the role of corruption exist. The "grasping hand" hypothesis regards corruption as a tax on foreign firms (and thus, ceteris paribus, a deterrent to foreign investment), while the "helping hand" regards corruption as a method of evading inefficient regulations and "greasing" the wheels of commerce. Empirically, although some studies have found a negative relationship between FDI flows and corruption (as proxied by perceptions), others have not. The empirical literature on the effects of the host country's corruption level on FDI inflows, however, has not found the commonly expected effects. Some empirical studies provide evidence of a negative link between corruption and FDI inflows, while others fail to find any significant relationship. would have to be assumed not to drive enforcement (and, as a corollary at the firm level, we would have to assume that companies allocate compliance resources in a manner that is not disproportionate to the actual level of corruption associated with a given country).
CONCLUSION
This Note has sought to explore the cross-national patterns associated with America's enforcement of the FCPA. In order to explain cross-national variation in FCPA enforcement actions, I propose a simple model in which the number of FCPA enforcement actions associated with a given country is a joint function of the level of U.S. FDI stock and the level of corruption in the host country. Using a new dataset of FCPA enforcement actions over the past decade, I find that the cross-national distribution of FCPA cases tracks both cross-national variation in U.S. foreign investment and variation in corruption levels (significant at the one-percent confidence level). This relationship is robust to the inclusion of various controls, including GDP per capita and region-fixed effects. Similarly, I find that the presence of bilateral frameworks for securities regulatory and enforcement cooperation appear to be associated with increased levels of FCPA enforcement.
Testing for other possible influences on FCPA enforcement patterns, I find that proxies for U.S. foreign policy considerations are generally not associated with cross-national variation in FCPA enforcement, once other relevant factors (such as GDP per capita, regional fixed effects, FDI, and corruption levels) are controlled for. Moreover, I find that the best predictor of the number of FCPA enforcement actions in a given country is the level of that country's experience with actual recorded corruption, rather than simply the relative level of corruption perceptions as measured by expert and business opinion. This could provide a measure of additional support to those who question whether the determinants of corruption and the determinants of corruption perceptions are, in fact, coterminous. Finally, I consider potential uses of FCPA enforcement statistics as an avenue for quantifying FCPA country risk, and examine whether enforcement-based metrics may have a future role to play in the academic study of corruption. Corruption-perception indices are extremely valuable tools for crossnational analysis; nevertheless, consumers of such data-including those in the private sector-must remain cognizant of the possibility that corruption and corruption perceptions may not have identical causes. My aim here is emphatically not to argue that enforcement-based measures can or should supplant existing measures of corruption; nevertheless, an additional measure of corruption based on FCPA-related investigation and enforcement data might well complement existing subjective measures of corruption perceptions. As Kaufmann et al. note:
Progress in fighting corruption on all fronts requires measurement of corruption itself, in order to diagnose problems and monitor results.
. . . Given the imperfections of any individual approach, it is appropriate to rely on a wide variety of different indicators both subjective and objective, individual as well as aggregate, cross-country as well as country-specific. This is important to monitor results on the ground, assess the concrete reality of corruption, and develop anticorruption programs."
